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This article focuses on various ways that the im-
plicit rate on demand deposits can be measured, and
the effects of using these implicit rates in analyzing
the demand for money. The presence of implicit
payments on demand deposits is a likely result of the
competitive nature of the banking system. Deposits
are a primary source of funds that banks can use to
earn a market rate of return. Competitive pressures
should force banks to offer depositors something in
return for the use of transactions balances. Since
the payment of explicit interest on transactions ac-
counts was forbidden until the introduction of NOW
accounts in 1973, and was regulated prior to the
advent of "Super NOW” accounts in 1983, banks
were forced to compete for all transactions balances
in a nonprice manner. This type of competition con-
tinues to occur with respect to demand deposits and
smaller NOW accounts. Some ways that this can be
done is by remitting service charges, providing cash
management services at subsidized rates, and giving
preferential treatment on loans to depositors.
Since the competition for deposits by the banking
system is likely to result in some form of implicit
payment, it is important to incorporate this behavior
when studying the demand for money. Omitting the
implicit return on demand deposits in a money de-
mand equation is likely to result in misspecification,
therefore biasing at least some of the estimated coeffi-
cients. Potentially, this bias could be serious enough
to substantially affect the ability of the equation to
predict future money demand. This could lead to the
unwarranted conclusion that the demand for money is
unstable and that the Federal Reserve should accom-
modate shifts in the money demand curve when in
fact no shifts have taken place.
Another related area where knowledge of implicit
interest payments is of importance is in understand-
ing the effects of deregulation in the banking indus-
try. The relative desirability and growth of new
types of accounts, such as “Super NOWs,” will
depend on the advantages they have over existing
accounts. This will involve a comparison between
the current implicit payments made on demand de-
posits and the explicit (as well as any implicit) pay-
ments accompanying the new accounts.
In order to analyze implicit interest rates and their
effects on money demand, three different estimates
of the implicit rates on demand deposits are exam-
ined. Specifically, the studies of Startz [12], Barro
and Santomero [1], and Klein [8] are reviewed.
Each of these articles provides very different methods
of arriving at an estimate of implicit rates. Startz
uses accounting data to calculate a measure of ser-
vices remitted, while Barro and Santomero use a
private survey to derive a marginal rate of remit-
tance. Klein, on the other hand, assumes that banks
costlessly evade regulations and pay a competitive
rate. Given the differences in methodology, it is not
surprising that the actual estimates differ. However,
all three estimates are highly correlated and show
movements in the same direction. One may, there-
fore, have more confidence in the way in which im-
plicit rates have changed than in their actual level.
An analysis of the effects of implicit interest rates
on the demand for money is also presented. The
rate derived by Barro and Santomero performs
especially well. The competitive rate calculated by
Klein also seems useful although there exist econo-
metric problems in interpreting its effect.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II dis-
cusses the derivation of each of the three implicit
rates and indicates some of the problems with each
construction. Section III compares the time series
properties of the various rates while section IV dis-
cusses the use of implicit rates in studying the de-
mand for money. Section V contains a brief con-
clusion.
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THE CONSTRUCTION OF IMPLICIT INTEREST RATES
ON DEMAND DEPOSITS
Startz's Method: The Use of
Accounting Data
1
In an interesting piece of research Startz con-
structs two basic measures of the implicit rate on
demand deposits. One uses Functional Cost Analysis
data, while the other uses the reports of income and
condition of all insured commercial banks. It is the
latter that will be reviewed here.
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Specifically, Startz’s measure of implicit interest
is composed of those expenses incurred in main-
taining a deposit account that are not charged to the
customer. Since banks are involved in joint produc-
tion, it is difficult to allocate expenses in an unam-
biguous manner. To overcome this problem it is
assumed that all noninterest expenses are linearly
allocated to demand deposits, time deposits, and
loans. Further, each activity is assumed to be inde-
pendent. Expenses are then allocated by the use of a
linear regression of net expenses on demand deposits,
time deposits, loans, and a constant, where the co-
efficient on demand deposits has the interpretation of
an implicit rate.
3 The regression is depicted by
equation (1)
where NETX are total bank expenses net of service
charges, DD are demand deposits, T are time de-
posits, L are loans, and e is a stochastic error term.
The regression is run on a combined time series/cross
section data set for each of the fifty states and the
District of Columbia over the years 1973, 1974, and
1975. The coefficients on time deposits and loans
are constrained to be constant (a constraint that can
not be statistically rejected).
Even though this constraint can not be rejected
over the period 1973-75, it seems unlikely that C T
would be constant over the sample period 1954-68.
This is because interest rate ceilings that were im-
posed on time and savings accounts in 1966 were
binding over most of the 1973-74 period. Therefore,
1 For another excellent example, see Becker [2].
2 The method using Functional Cost Analysis data was
not examined because over time the data are somewhat
incompatible due to changes in the sample of banks par-
ticipating in the survey, and changes in the way that
indirect expenses are allocated.
3 For a more detailed breakdown of net expenses, see the
appendix to Startz [12].
these deposits may have been subject to some implicit
payment as well. This would make C T higher than
when interest rate ceilings were nonbinding or non-
existent and consequently would bias the estimates
of Startz’s implicit rates downward over the early
part of the sample.
The implicit rate calculated by Startz, RDDS, is
obtained by using the estimated coefficients C T and
CL from the regression depicted in equation (1) to
impute some of the noninterest expenses to time
deposits and loans. Specifically, the volume of loans
on the end of year balance sheets of insured commer-
cial banks is multiplied by C L and the amount of time
deposits is multiplied by C T. The sum of these two
components is subtracted from net expenses. The
remaining amount of expenses is attributed to de-
mand deposits and is divided by the level of demand
deposits yielding an average implicit rate. This
slightly overstates the average rate since the constant
in equation (1) is not actually zero, but small and
positive. The results of this procedure, for the years
1954-68, are reported in column 1 of table I. This
implicit rate is seen to be neither zero nor is it the
equivalent of a competitive rate.
While Startz’s procedure is interesting, it does
contain a number of conceptual problems, many of
which are pointed out by Rush [10]. The major
problems involve the use of accounting data. These
data are not conceptually equivalent to measures that
are economically important. Specifically the data
used by Startz underestimate true economic costs
since they omit a normal rate of return as an oppor-
tunity cost, giving a downward bias to his implicit
rate. This opportunity cost is the cost of attracting
capital to the bank.
Another equally important point is that the num-
bers contained in the report of income and condition
are incapable of reflecting the extent to which fore-
gone earnings enter the implicit rate. For instance,
if a depositor is charged a lower loan rate based on
his average demand deposit balances, this would con-
stitute an implicit payment on these balances, but
would not be reflected as an expense on the bank’s
accounts. Therefore, the bank’s foregone earnings
will not be allocated as part of an implicit rate on
demand deposits. As a practical matter Rush shows
that this downward bias is important.
Another problem with Startz’s procedure is that it
uses average costs and therefore produces an average
rate of return. In terms of economic behavior it is a
marginal rate that is important. That is, individuals
will determine the amount of their money holdings in






1954 .85 1.50 1.08 2.87 1.58
1955 .91 1.50 1.61 2.94 2.18
1956 .93 1.50 2.57 3.03 3.31
1957 1.04 1.57 2.96 3.26 3.81
1958 1.06 1.57 1.78 3.38 2.46
1959 1.14 1.59 3.12 3.53 3.97
1960 1.27 1.72 2.98 3.86 3.85
1961 1.20 1.72 2.17 3.90 2.97
1962 1.19 1.72 2.43 4.08 3.26
1963 1.23 1.77 2.66 4.17 3.55
1964 1.15 1.80 3.03 4.18 3.97
1965 1.07 1.93 3.40 4.23 4.38
1966 1.18 2.12 4.40 4.45 5.55
1967 1.22 2.26 3.97 4.67 5.10
1968 1.58 2.42 4.72 4.67 5.90
any particular account based on what the next dollar
will earn when placed in that account. Therefore,
for Startz’s measure of an implicit rate to be useful,
the average rate must closely approximate the mar-
ginal rate of return on demand deposits. This may
not be the case especially with regard to individual
demand deposit accounts. In many instances the
amount of services provided for an account is not
directly related to average balances but to the activity
within the account. Banks often provide free pro-
cessing of checks based on a minimum balance or
minimum average balance requirement. For accounts
meeting these requirements the amount of free ser-
vices an individual receives depends upon the amount
of checks written, and not on the amount of money
on deposit. Therefore, although the average return
on demand deposit balances is positive, the marginal
return is zero.
4
Also, since it is the value placed on services that is
important, using cost data brings about another prob-
lem. This implicit rate can move for two distinct
reasons, each of which has a different implication.
In one case the implicit rate could rise because more
services are being provided free of charge, while in
the second case existing services could become more
costly. Only in the first case would the depositor
place a greater return on the holding of demand
deposits.
Barro and Santomero’s Method: The
Construction of a Marginal Remittance Rate
Another method for constructing implicit rates is
employed by Barro and Santomero [1]. By using a
private survey the authors are able to obtain the
rate at which charges are remitted as a function of
4 As the level of market interest rates changes banks account. One also would expect that measurements of
seem to respond by changing minimum and minimum implicit interest rates would rise as well, and that the
average balance requirements, thus changing the point at implicit rate is proxying for this type of behavior. In-
which demand deposits in certain types of accounts
earn a marginal rate of zero. For instance, a prolonged
cluding an implicit rate might therefore be preferable to
rise in the level of interest rates would prompt banks to
omitting it, but it would be better to analyze the relevant
change their minimum balance requirements. A marginal
factors determining the level of demand deposits directly.
rate of zero would occur at a lower level of balances and
Since banks offer a menu of accounts, the optimal pro-
individuals would hold less money in a demand deposit
cedure would be to analyze each type of account sepa-
rately. For an example of this, see Boyd [4].
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5 This rate of remittance
can be used to calculate a marginal rate of return on
demand deposits since it indicates the rate earned by
an extra dollar of demand deposits. Because this
rate is a marginal rate and is derived from an actual
schedule of remittance it is a valuable contribution to
the literature on implicit interest rates.
The implicit rate calculated by Barro and Santo-
mero, RDDBS, is displayed in column 2 of table I.
Like Startz’s rate, this rate is not zero. Its move-
ment also appears to closely follow the movements
in the rate paid on savings and loan shares, RS
(column 4, table I). The differential between RS
and RDDBS is fairly constant, especially over the
latter part of the period when the authors indicate
greater confidence in their implicit rate calculations.
RDDBS also does not appear to be equivalent to a
competitive rate.
A weakness of this approach is that it is limited to
accounts in which service charges are remitted as a
function of average balances. This practice while
common for commercial depositors is not widely used
for household accounts. As pointed out by Boyd [4],
banks tend to offer an array of accounts that provide
services and remit charges in different ways. Some
accounts require minimum balances, while others
base their remittance of charges on average balances.
Some even tie their schedule of services with the
holding of funds in other types of accounts.
It may be that the rate calculated by Barro and
Santomero is not an exogenous constant from the
standpoint of the depositor. The depositor may be
able to influence the rate by altering his average bal-
ances. (This would be especially true if the remit-
tance rate were nonlinearly related to deposit size.)
For instance, once deposit balances have grown to the
point where all service charges have been remitted,
the return on the next dollar deposited would be zero.
However, once a depositor reached this point the
bank would presumably reward him in other ways.
5 Barro and Santomero asked the top 100 commercial
banks to provide a time series for the remittance of ser-
vice charges on various types of demand deposit accounts
as a function of average balances. They used the rate
information on smaller accounts in the hope of excluding
commercial accounts, or at least large commercial ac-
counts. A typical piece of information would be that
service charges were remitted at the rate of $.15 per
month per 100 dollars of average balances, which would
correspond to a rate of 1.8 percent. This was appropriate
for the purposes of their study since they concentrated
on household accounts. For an examination of M1 it is
necessary to also include a measure of the implicit rate
received by businesses, or to study the demand for money
by households and businesses separately. Data limita-
tions make it difficult to implement the latter suggestion.
The derived rate of Barro and Santomero also
assumes that an account receiving implicit interest
through remittance of service charges is receiving
only this particular benefit from the bank. If a de-
mand depositor simultaneously received a remittance
plus favorable terms on a loan, the terms being
based on average deposit size, then the Barro and
Santomero measure would understate the true im-
plicit rate. Essentially, one can view the Barro and
Santomero rate as the correct marginal rate under
the assumption that banks tailor the means of paying
an implicit rate to their customers, and that each
method roughly yields the same rate. In this context
the rate calculated for one type of account would be a
reasonable approximation for rates on all types of
accounts.
Klein’s Method: A Competitive Rate
The third method examined is a competitive im-
plicit interest rate derived by Klein [8]. Klein
reports an implicit rate for M1, but this is easily
converted into an implicit rate on demand deposits.
The results are displayed in column 3 of table I.
Basically Klein assumes that the regulation forbid-
ding explicit interest payments on demand deposits is
costlessly evaded. Competitive pressures within the
banking industry force banks to offer the equivalent
of a competitive rate in order to attract depositors.
Formally, Klein’s implicit rate, RDDK, is ex-
pressed in equation (2).
Defining notation: DD are demand deposits, RCP is
the rate of 4-6 month commercial paper, r DD are
reserves held against demand deposits, r D are total
reserves, RCP
W is a weighted annual average of the
commercial paper rate with the weights being deter-
mined by monthly discount window borrowings,
RDIS
W is a similarly weighted average of the dis-
count rate at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
GDD are government demand deposits, r G are re-
serves held against government demand deposits and
are assumed to be the same as the average for ordi-
nary demand deposits, L D are expected losses on
deposits and are zero for the period 1954-68 exam-
ined in this study, and S DD are average service
charges per dollar of demand deposits.
6 ECONOMIC REVIEW, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1983Equation (2) implies that banks remit the short
term market rate of interest adjusted for reserves
held against demand deposits, plus any subsidies
received from discount window borrowings and the
holding of government deposits (government deposits
receiving a zero rate of interest) minus service
charges. With the exception of the last term, Klein’s
rate may be interpreted as a marginal rate if the
level of discount window borrowings permitted and
the level of government demand deposits at a bank
are related to bank deposit size. Also, this rate is
likely to be highly collinear with the commercial
maining terms in equation (2) do not possess suffi-
cient variability.
Klein’s rate has certain attractive properties not
found in the other two rates. Unlike Startz it doesn’t
use accounting data and therefore doesn’t suffer from
the biases inherent in that procedure. Also, Klein’s
derivation doesn’t require any assumptions about the
specific way that implicit interest payments are made,
or the relationship between various ways of making
such payments. It therefore circumvents some prob-
lems that potentially affect the Barro and Santomero
procedure.
However, Klein’s rate is not without problems.
For example, the level of services provided by banks
to depositors may not adjust continuously with
changes in market rates. That is, it may be very
costly to make instantaneous adjustments in the level
of services provided or the technology for producing
services may be such that continuous adjustment is
impossible. Banks may only be able to offer a dis-
crete set of services and may require market rates to
move by some threshold amount before offering addi-
tional services.
The ability to offer a competitive rate that adjusts
rapidly may be more of a problem regarding house-
hold accounts than it is with respect to corporate
accounts. For instance, large corporate customers
often use many different services ranging from the
extension of credit at favorable terms to sophisticated
cash management techniques. The terms at which
credit is extended are often related to average de-
mand deposit holdings, while cash management ser-
vices are paid for by some combination of compen-
sating balances and fees. The method of payment is
tailored to each customer and the rate that compen-
sating balances yield is tied to market rates dis-
counted by some portion of the reserve requirement.
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These rates are usually adjusted monthly making the
implicit rate very close to a competitive rate for large
corporate customers. It is unclear whether such easy
adjustment is possible for depositors who do not
use a large array of bank services.
Some indirect evidence presented by Rush [10]
implies that a competitive implicit rate is not a bad
approximation. He compares the relative change in
bank profitability between banks in New England
States offering NOW accounts (Massachusetts and
New Hampshire) with banks in the same region that
did not offer these accounts (namely banks in New
Jersey, Connecticut, and Vermont). The profit-
ability ratios are examined both before and after the
introduction of NOW accounts. If implicit rates are
less than competitive, and the explicit payment
allowed on NOW accounts is close to a competitive
rate, then the profitability of banks offering NOW
accounts should decline if implicit payments are less
than competitive. If the ratios remain roughly the
same, then the evidence favors the hypothesis that
implicit rates are competitive. Rush’s results can
generally be viewed as favoring the hypothesis that
implicit rates are competitive.
There are some additional problems that are com-
mon to Klein’s rate and the estimates in the other
two studies. Each estimate attempts to measure
the value that depositors place on free services ob-
tained from the bank per additional dollar of deposits.
The cost to the bank of providing these services need
not be equivalent to the value placed on these services
by the depositor. In general the depositor would
prefer an explicit payment implying that these rates
are biased upward. However, explicit payments are
taxed while services not charged for aren’t. This
factor will bias the implicit rates in the opposite
direction. The sum of these offsetting effects is
unclear and will depend on individual preferences
and marginal tax rates.
III.
A COMPARISON OF THE VARIOUS ESTIMATES OF
THE IMPLICIT RATE ON DEMAND DEPOSITS
As indicated in the preceding section all of the
various implicit rates contain interesting information,
but each suffers from a number of problems. The
question then remains, are the problems so large as
to make these estimates unproductive. In part this
6 For more detail concerning the payment for cash man-
agement services, see Simpson [11].
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explanatory power when used in studies of the de-
mand for money. This is done in section IV. How-
ever, it may be useful to compare the measures
themselves.
The comparison between all three rates is con-
tained in table I and in figure 1. Column 1 of table I
contains Startz’s rate, RDDS; column 2 contains the
marginal rate calculated by Barro and Santomero,
RDDBS; column 3 displays the competitive rate
derived by Klein, RDDK; column 4 exhibits the
average annual dividend rate of shares of savings and
loan associations, RS; while column 5 displays the
4-6 month commercial paper rate, RCP. The time
period examined is 1954-68 since this is the period
over which the various rates overlap. Figure 1 is a
graph of each implicit rate allowing for easier com-
parison.
As can be seen from both table I and figure 1 the
levels of the rates are quite different, but the move-
ments of the various rates over time are correlated.
The exact correlation is displayed in table II. The
information contained in table II indicates that all
three rates are highly correlated.
IV.
THE USE OF IMPLICIT RATES IN THE STUDY OF
THE DEMAND FOR MONEY
In order to evaluate the usefulness of each of the
three proxies, their explanatory power is compared
in a demand, for money equation over the period
1954-68. The following equation was estimated using
annual data.
where RDD l = 0, RDD 2 = RDDS, RDD 3 =
RDDBS, and RDD 4 = RDDK. M1 is equal to
currency plus demand deposits and P is the GNP
deflator. In equation (3) real money demand is
expressed as a function of real transactions income,
which is approximated by real consumption,
7 and the
7 Consumption was used as a scale variable since I believe
that it is more closely related to transactions income. In
Dotsey [6], it is found to be superior to GNP in explain-
ing demand deposit behavior. Also, many studies of
money demand use permanent income as a scale variable.
Since consumption is closely related to permanent income
one may also wish to interpret the equation in terms of
permanent income rather than transactions income. For
more detail see [6].
opportunity cost of holding money. Two opportunity
costs are used since different individuals may have
access to different rates. The opportunity costs are
expressed as differentials in interest rates and have
been entered in semilogarithmic form for the reasons
outlined in Friedman and Schwartz [7; p. 265].
Basically, this specification assumes that the absolute
level of opportunity costs is important in determining
the demand for money balances. This implies that a
doubling of the opportunity cost from l-2 percent
would have a smaller effect than the doubling of the
opportunity cost from 5-10 percent. In a log linear
model both changes would have an equivalent effect.
The results of the four regressions given in equa-
tion (3) are contained in table III. The effect of
including the implicit rate derived by Barro and
Santomero is especially striking. The standard error
of the regression declines by 38 percent, while the
presence of serial correlation is greatly reduced.
Table II
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN
THE VARIOUS IMPLICIT RATES
RDDS RDDBS RDDK
RDDS 1.00 .78 .71
RDDBS .78 1.00 .85
RDDK .71 .85 1.00
8 ECONOMIC REVIEW, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1983Given the results of using Barro and Santomero’s
implicit rate, a possible interpretation of the serial
correlation in the regression that omits implicit rates
is that the regression is misspecified. The correlation
present in the errors occurs because the equation fails
to take into consideration an important variable that
influences the demand for money.
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The implicit interest rate derived by Startz does
not seem to be a useful measure in explaining the
demand for money. Its addition actually reduces the
performance of the regression. On the other hand,
Klein’s competitive implicit rate improves the de-
mand for money equation slightly. Of interest in
this latter case is the large change in the coefficients
on the interest rate variables from those in the other
three equations. Unfortunately, the manner in which
this rate is calculated makes it difficult to evaluate its
econometric performance. The derivation of Klein’s
rate makes the presence of spurious correlation pos-
sible, and since these effects are similar to the type
of effects expected in theory, it is generally difficult
8 The regressions also were corrected for first order serial
correlation. Although the standard errors are greatly
reduced the general message is unchanged.
to discriminate between the two.
9 The nature of the
spurious correlation can be seen by examining the
first term on the right-hand side of equation (2),
in obtaining the level of demand deposits then there
and DD, and hence M1. For instance, if the measure-
ment of demand deposits is greater than the actual
will be raised. This is indeed regrettable since a
competitive rate seems to be a reasonable approxi-
mation for an implicit rate, especially with respect to
corporate accounts.
10
9 For a more detailed discussion, see Carlson and Frew
[5]. Friedman and Schwartz [7] also present an inter-
esting discussion in footnote 46, pp. 270-74. Friedman and
Schwartz present evidence over a much longer sample
period,. where they look at data over peaks and troughs
of business cycles. Klein’s rate more accurately reflects
real rather than spurious effects in their money demand
equations.
10 When RS-RDDK is dropped from the third regres-
sion, the coefficient on RCP-RDDK drops dramatically,
and when RCP-RDDK is eliminated the coefficient on




Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4
CONSTANT .10(1.17) .19(1.19) .27(6.98) .23(3.20)
LN (Real
Consumption) .81(6.90) .60(3.16) .49(12.86) .66(7.19)
RS -.16(-66.04)
RCP -.008(-1.25)
RS - RDDS -.13(-2.60)
RCP - RDDS -.008(-.66)
RS - RDDBS -.13(-10.52)
RCP - RDDBS -.012(-2.83)
RS - RDDK -.063(-5.82)
RCP - RDDK -.51(-5.76)
S.E.R. .0138 .0224 .00858 .0137
- 2
R .86 .64 .95 .87
D.W. .86 .67 1.81 1.49
t-statistics are in parenthesis.
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SUMMARY AND COMMENTS ON THE EFFECTS OF
DEREGULATION IN THE BANKING INDUSTRY
In this article the value of incorporating an implicit
interest rate in money demand analysis has been
examined. Specifically, three very different con-
structions have been investigated. While all three
are interesting, the rate derived by Barro and Santo-
mero seems to be the most useful in the context of
analyzing the demand for M1. Although additional
information on the ways implicit interest is paid by
banks is desirable, the results obtained here indicate
that this variable merits updating. Klein’s rate, al-
though it is probably a good proxy for interest im-
plicitly earned by corporate customers (and may be a
good estimate for all depositors) is unfortunately
plagued by econometric problems that make inter-
preting its effect in regression equations difficult.
The rate derived by Startz is subject to a number of
procedural problems and did not prove to be very
useful in explaining the demand for money over the
rather short sample period studied in this article.
The general conclusion is that implicit rates, espe-
cially the approximation generated by Barro and
Santomero are important elements in determining
the demand for money. This being the case, these
rates will also be important in analyzing the effects
of current and future deregulation in the banking
industry. A detailed analysis of the effects of deregu-
lation would be somewhat beyond the scope of this
study, but a limited discussion is germane to the main
thrust of the article.
In order to understand the ways in which deregu-
lation has affected and will affect the behavior of
monetary aggregates, in particular M1, it will be
necessary to examine the rate of returns that new
transactions accounts yield relative to the rates im-
plicitly earned by demand deposits. This is because
it is this differential that constitutes the opportunity
cost of continuing to use a standard demand deposit
account. For instance, the 5¼ percent interest rate
paid on NOW accounts overstates the relative advan-
tage of using a NOW account, since demand deposits
implicitly earn a rate of return greater than zero.11
Without considering implicit rates it is difficult to
understand why all consumer accounts did not switch
to NOW accounts almost immediately. For certain
types of depositors a NOW account may offer very
little if anything beyond that of a regular demand
deposit.
Of course, considering only implicit rates in an
analysis of the differences between demand deposits
and newer types of transactions accounts would be too
limiting. There are many characteristics that distin-
guish one type of account from another. Minimum
or average balance requirements would be an example
of such a characteristic. It may also be that banks
offer different implicit rates to different types of
depositors. A deeper understanding of the demand
for money may require that different types of ac-
counts be studied separately. Data limitations un-
fortunately prevent analysis at this level.
The point of this article is not to detract from the
importance of other features that determine the be-
havior of depositors, but to describe the effects that
implicit rates have on the demand for money. Al-
though implicit rates are only one aspect that influ-
ence the choice between transactions accounts, there
are numerous reasons for believing that they are an
important aspect that require more attention in in-
vestigating the demand for money.
11 The analysis assumes that at the margin NOW ac-
counts earn a much smaller implicit rate than standard
demand deposit accounts.
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